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I. INTRODUCTION'

The murky worlds of federalism, administrative law, and banking
regulation collide in Watters v. Wachovia.2 When the Supreme Court granted
certiorari, the acceptance was seen as a move designed to halt what scholars
have termed "preemption creep." Such preemption creep stemmed from the
heightened deference the Court has given in recent years to administrative
agency interpretations of federal statutory law under the Chevron system of
analysis.3 This, in turn, seems to have emboldened federal agencies to take
the unprecedented step of issuing banking regulations solely for the purpose
of preempting state oversight and consumer protection law.
At the district and circuit court level, Wachovia successfully argued that
such administrative action was permissible under the Chevron scheme, and
put a stop to nearly all alleged "visitorial" power that states could use to exert
influence over consumer lending practices. 4 Curiously, since the Court
could easily have let such a lower court ruling stand without granting
certiorari, one would imagine that there were a number ofJustices inclined
to vote against the Bank's position. Ultimately, however, a majority of the
Court not only affirmed the lower court's ruling, but further expanded the
ability of the federal agencies to deny states the capacity to regulate banking
activity within their borders in any meaningful way.' Unfortunately, the
majority's reasoning was not only unsound; it avoided the most important
issue raised by the case: the role of administrative agencies to preempt state
law.
This Note asserts that state consumer protection laws are not preempted
by the National Banking Act (NBA) in light of both sound canons of
statutory construction and principles of federalism. Part II briefly recounts
the conflicting interpretive norms ofpreemption law and administrative law.
Part III examines the NBA and its progeny, as well as key cases interpreting
its role in the "dual banking system." Part IV details the factual context and
procedural background of Watters. Part V critiques the majority opinion and
explains why the dissenting view is both constitutionally sound and better
protects consumers from predatory lending practices, many of which

I

Watters is also the answer to a potential trivia question suitable for use at cocktail parties among

Supreme Court aficionados: What 2007 case united Justice Stevens and Scalia in dissent against a majority
bloc that included Justices Alito and Ginsburg?
2
127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007).
3
See generally Chevron USA., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(establishing the basic framework of analysis in state law preemption cases).
4
See generally Wachovia Bank, NA v. Watters, 334 F. Supp. 2d 957 (W.D. Mich. 2004).
5
Seegenerally Waters, 127 S. Ct. at 1572-73.
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contributed to the current subprime mortgage crisis. Part VI summarizes
and responds to one scholar's assertion that the opinion was policy-driven.
Finally, this Note concludes that the Court should have utilized the Barnett
test, and required greater accountability by the federal government for its role
in banking regulation.
II. PREEMPTION AND THE ROLE OF FEDERALISM

The battle over the dual banking system is really a conflict over
preemption and statutory interpretation ofthe NBA. Therefore, an overview
of preemption law is warranted.
The Supremacy Clause authorizes Congress to preempt state law if it
chooses.6 Statutory preemption is divided into three categories.7 Under
express preemption, Congress explicitly states its intention to overrule state
law. Under implied conflict preemption, congressional intent is inferred
when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible or
impractical. 9 Similarly, implied conflict exists when state law is a legitimate
obstacle to the full accomplishment of Congress's goals and purposes.'0 The
broadest form is field preemption." To establish this, a litigant must
demonstrate that a high degree of federal regulation shows a congressional
intent to occupy the field and preempt the states entirely from regulating in
that area.' 2 It is important to note that for all of these categories,
13
congressional intent is the lodestone from which all analysis must spring.
Generally, courts have applied a presumption against preemption.14 A
court starts with the assumption that the historic police powers of the states
are not superseded by a federal law unless supported by the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress." On a broad level, this idea is rooted in
principles of federalism, and courts will generally refer to the long-standing
constitutional ideal of a government of limited powers. One interesting
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent notes that the presumption
against preemption began to appear at the same time the New Deal Court
was expanding congressional power under a broad interpretation of the
6

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.

8

Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REv. 737,752 (2004).
Id.

9
10

1
12
13

14
15

Id.

Id. at 752-53.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 753-55.
Id.
See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) citing Rice, 331 U.S. at 218.
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Commerce Clause. 16 Thus, the anti-preemption presumption may have
been created as a new check to balance the increased Federal Commerce
Clause power.17 Even if such a balance of power motivated the Court at the
time, it does not necessarily justify its continued use today."8
Still, there are powerful arguments in its favor. According to one legal
scholar, a presumption against preemption "effectively make [s] congressional
deliberation a prerequisite to preemption." 19 There are several systemic
advantages of such a presumption. First, by lowering the amount of
preemption, it rewards state lawmakers for initiative and creation of a
legislative "laboratory." Second, it creates accountability for Congress by
forcing them to indicate that they are taking both control and consequent
responsibility for their actions. Third, it places those who may be adversely
affected by the preemption of state law on notice to allow them to lobby
against the Act if they choose. 20 Justice Stevens was particularly concerned
that states be placed on notice of a threat to their legislative scheme, calling
the anti-preemption presumption a "structural safeguard[] inherent in the
normal operation of the legislative process.., to defend state interests from
2
undue infringement." '
At the same time, the anti-preemption presumption is not without its
detractors. Congress may not always be aware of statutory schemes in all
fifty states, so the presumption places a high burden on drafters to anticipate
possible conflicts. One commentator has noted that the choice to place states
on notice through explicit indication by Congress is an arbitrary rather than
a necessary option.22 For example, if the presumption were made in favor of
preemption, states would then be aware of the need to lobby federal
legislators to explicitly affirm a congressional desire to avoid preemption in
any legislation that affects their interests. Thus, the current presumption is
really a normative choice to place the burden on private actors rather than
states to lobby Congress to be more explicit.
Various scholars have reached different conclusions about the merits of
such a choice. The argument to place the burden on private actors may have
been made best by Professor Roderick Hills. He argues that the presumption

16

See generally Mendelson, supra note 7.

17
Is

See id.
See id.

19

Id. at 753.
Id.
Geierv. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861,907 (2000) (Stevens,J., dissenting) (citing

20
21

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth, 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985)).
2
See Note, New Evidence on the PresumptionAgainst Preemption:An EmpiricalStudy of Congressional
Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1604, n.10 (2007).
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against preemption should be a "preference-eliciting statutory default rule. " '
From his standpoint, powerful business interests generally have great
incentives to be pro-preemption, due to the desire for a single set of
regulatory requirements and fewer regulatory bodies to appease. These
actors will generally put Congress on notice of their desire to preempt and
therefore influence drafters to express such a preference explicitly.
By contrast, state and consumer groups form a less organized, more
diverse lobbying group. Thus, when opposing certain state interests,
Congress is less likely to insert statutory language that expresses a lack of a
desire to preempt various state schemes. Other scholars take issue with this
premise and argue, although not as effectively as Professor Hills, that states
are powerful actors with direct access to congressmen who could implement
the states' interest in legislation. 24 Under this view, the preference-eliciting
default rule would favor no presumption against preemption.
Professor Hills' position seems to better reflect the relative influence of
typical pro-preemption and anti-preemption forces.25 Just as a contract is
often interpreted against the drafter, legislation can be most fairly interpreted
26
against the most powerful lobbying groups, as long as an ambiguity exists.
In light of the extensive deregulation of the banking industry over the past
twenty-five years, few would question the legislative influence of the banking
lobby.
A. Administrative Law Analysis
Although preemption case law generally presumes that state and federal
law can coexist, courts deal with an entirely different set of presumptions in
the complex field of administrative law. In its 1984 opinion in Chevron

23
24

Id. at 1610.
Id. at 1610-11. For example, Professor Goldsmith argues:

States are among the most influential of interest groups in the federal legislative process, and
thus are relatively well suited to convince Congress to revise unwantedjudicial interpretations.
Erroneousjudicial preemptions (which adversely affect states) are thus more likely, on balance,
to be corrected than erroneous judicial non-preemptions (which adversely affect groups that
are in general less influential in Congress than states).
Professor Alan Schwartz makes a similar argument, attempting to prove by a
mathematical model that, at least in the product liability context, 'it is harder for Congress to
correct an erroneous judicial interpretation [finding non-preemption] than it is for Congress
to correct an erroneous judicial interpretation [finding preemption].
Id.
2s
26

Id. at 1610.
See generally id.
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U.SA., Inc. v. National Resources Dfense Council, Inc.,27 the Supreme Court
implemented a new framework for determining the appropriate occasion for
28
courts to defer to the statutory interpretation by an administrative agency.
Chevron concerned the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
interpretation of the Clean Air Act that entails an emissions limitation, via
the EPA, of all "stationary sources." 29 The EPA read the statutory term
"stationary source" to encompass an entire plant, instead of confining their
interpretation to a sole combustion apparatus. 3 As discussed in detail in
Section IV, Watters involved a similarly arguable interpretation of a federal
statutory mandate.
Chevron requires federal courts to defer to any reasonable interpretation
by an agency responsible for the administration of a statute.3' Such deference
is only due, however, if Congress has not clearly specified its intent regarding
the matter at hand. In establishing the desired scope ofjudicial review of
agency interpretation, the Chevron Court devised what has become known
as the "Chevron two-step." 32 The first step of the analyses calls on the court
to decipher "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue," 33 and if so, "the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."3 4 If the court determines that
"Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue," 31 the
court must desist from statutory interpretation of its own devise and merely
decide "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute." 36 Said differently, the court first determines if the statute
resolves the specific issue or is silent or ambiguous with regard to the issue.37
If the court determines that the statute is silent or ambiguous, the court then

2
28
2

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Thomas W. Merrill,JudicialDference to ExecutivePrecedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992).
Richardj. PierceJr., Chevron and itsAftennath:JudicialReview ofAgency InterpretationsofStatutory

Provisions,41 VAND. L.REV. 301 (1988).
30
Id. ("That statutory interpretation was adopted as part of the EPA's 'bubble concept,' which
is based on the EPA's belief that it can simultaneously further the inherently conflicting goals of the Clean
Air Act-improved air quality and continued economic growth-most effectively by imposing emissions
limitations on an entire plant, and by conferring upon the owner of the plant both the obligation and
discretion to determine the means by which to reduce emissions.").
31
Id. at 302.
32
Id. at 301.
3
Id. at 301-302.
34
Id. at302.
35
Id.
3
37

Id.

See id.
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affirms the agency's interpretation of the statute, assuming that the
interpretation is reasonable.38
B. Rationalesfor the Chevron Presumption:
Chevron deference or the "two-step" formulation is a focal point for vast
scholarly attention. 39 Scholars, however, generally fall within two distinct
factions. One faction argues that Chevron's purpose is to prevent the courts
from interfering with duties allocated to the legislature delegated to the
executive branch; a separation of powers argumentil This position
emphasizes that courts should "abide by and police congressional intent."41
The -other faction subscribes to the notion that Chevron deference is
motivated by an alleged superior competence and expertise that agencies have
relative to courts in interpreting the statutes that agencies are charged with
implementing.4 2
The contours of Chevron step-one, ambiguity about congressional intent,
exists mainly in the eye of the beholder. Justice Scalia wrote:
Where one stands on this last point-- how clear is clear--may have
much to do with where one stands on.. .what Chevron means ...
[O]ne who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute
is apparent from its text and from the relationship with other laws,
thereby finds [clear congressional intent] ... Contrariwise, one who

abhors the "plain meaning" rule, and is willing to permit the

3
39
40

Id.
Note, 77T Two Faces ofChevron, 120 HARV.L. REv.1562,1562 (2007) [hereinafterTwo Faces].
See id. at n.3 (citing Stephen Breyer,Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN.

L. REV. 363,389-90 (1986); David M. Hasen, TheAmbiguous BasisofJudicialDeference toAdministrativeRules,
17 YALE J. ON REG. .327, 329-30 (2000); Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory
Interpretation,15 CARDOZO L. REV. 219, 260 (1993); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied
Delegations,Agency Expetlise, andthe Misplaced Legacy ofSkidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 735,739 (2002); Ronald
M. Levin, ldenm 5ing Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1, 4 (1985); RichardJ. Pierce,Jr.,
Chevron and Its Aftermath:JudicialReview of Agency Interpretationsof Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV.
301,305 (1988); Antonin ScaliaJudicialDeferene toAdministrativeInterpretationsofLaw, 1989 DUKEL.J. 511,
514 (1989)).
41
See Two Faces, supra note 39, at 1562.
42
Id. See, e.g., Pierce Jr., supra note 29. Note that additional views have been expressed. Some
of these views encompass a mixture of each faction illustrated above discussed supra. This segment of the
note, however, will focus only on the two prevailing views concerning Chevron deference.
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apparent meaning of a statute to be impeached by legislative history,
will more frequently find agency liberating ambiguity....
Often the thorniest issue for a court to determine is whether Congress
intended to set a "ceiling," "floor," or both in terms of the federal law. A
federal auto safety law, for example, may require seat belt installation, but a
state may require additional safety features, like airbags, unless congressional
intent to make this a "ceiling" can be logically implied. 44 While silence may
sometimes be golden, it can lead to a variety of conflicting interpretations of
congressional intent in the preemption arena. As detailed in Section IV(d),
infra, the National Banking Act was a statute that launched no less than four
different judicial resolutions based on Chevron's framework. This division
stems in part from the somewhat convoluted history of federal banking
regulation.
III. NATIONAL BANKACT, ITS PROGENYAND BARNETT:

THE DuAL BANKING SYSTEM

On a narrow level, the decision in Watters turned on the proper
interpretation of a statute passed over 140 years ago, which, itself was rooted
in issues that trace back to the founding of the United States. In pertinent
part, the National Banking Act grants nationally chartered banks both
enumerated powers and "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to
carry on the business of banking." 41 In addition, as a means of limiting
duplicative or conflicting state regulation, the Act requires that: "[n]o
national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by
Federal law...."'
A. A ChronologicalElaborationof the United States NationalBanking
System
To effectively analyze the congressional intent behind the drafting of the
NBA, an understanding of the historical context in which the NBA was
passed is germane.

43

Scalia, supra note 40, at 520.

44
45

See Mendelson, supra note 7,at 752-53.
12 U.S.C. S24(Seventh) (2006).
Id. at S 484(a).

46
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47
Prior to 1791,the United States lacked a discernible banking system.
In 1787, the drafters of the Constitution sought to remedy this predicament
by incorporating provisions within the document empowering the federal
government to "coin money and regulate the value thereof"4 8 As a result,
states were stripped of the very same powers. The federal government,
however, was not explicitly granted the power to charter or establish a
national bank.49
Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, in a 1790 proposal, sought to
establish a privately owned Bank of the United States, which would provide
public functions vital to the developing economy.-0 After intense debate, the
Bank of the United States opened in 1791 in Philadelphia.5 1 In 1811,
political opponents rallied to close the institution, and it remained closed for
the next five years. 2 Subsequently, a second national charter lasted from
.1816 through 1836.53 President Andrew Jackson then vetoed a renewal of
this charter, initiating what came to be known as the "free banking era. " 54
The free banking era was a consequence of the failure of the national
banking system. 5 States were left to regulate their own banking systems,
creating instability, not only in the national currency, but widespread failure
in the banking system in general.5 6 Subsequent to the initiation of the Civil
War, numerous flaws in the banking and monetary system became evident.
For example:

The federal government needed to borrow money from northern
banks in order to fund the war. Because it could not legally obtain
these funds in bank credit, the federal government was forced to

47
Andrew T. Reardon,An Examination ofRecent Preemption Issues in Banking Law, 90 IOwA L. REV.
347,350 (2004).
48
Id.
49
See generallyJONATHAN R. MACEYETAL., BANIGNG IAWAND REGULATION 2-4 (3d ed. 2001).
so
Reardon,supra note 47, at 351. James Madison, however, argued that Hamilton's proposal was
unconstitutional because the Constitution does not contain an express grant for the establishment of a
national bank by the federal government. Id.
51
Id. (citing Acts to Charter the Bank of the United States, chs. X-XI, 1 Stat. 191, 196 (1791)).
52
See Reardon, supra note 47, at 351.
53
Id.
s4
Id.
ss
See id. at 352. The free banking era derived its name from the ease of creation of new banks
under state law. Id. at 351.
S6
Id. at 351-52.
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demand payment in specie (gold or silver), creating a tight money
supply and prompting the hoarding of gold. 7
The National Banking Act sought to remedy the failures illustrated
above.
In 1864, the NBA was enacted to advance the development of a national
banking structure."8 The NBA's original provisions granted plentiful powers
to national banks, such as "incidental powers... necessary to carry on the
business of banking," and a bar against subjection of national banks to
"visitorial powers," meaning any form of direct state regulation, absent those
permitted under federal law. 9
Congress provided no indication that the express grant of powers
derived from the NBA could be exercised by any entity other than a national
bank, such as a bank subsidiary. 6° In fact, at the time the Act was passed,
national banks were not authorized to own subsidiaries that carried on
banking activity, so the original intent of the visitorial powers rule could not
have been designed to include such parties.
Subsequently, the status of federal banking remained unchanged for
approximately 100 years after the enactment of the NBA.61 Only national
banks exercised the "incidental powers" granted by the statute.62
In the 1990s, deregulation transformed the banking industry.
Significantly, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 amended the NBA to
allow banks to extend their business into a broader range of services. It also
placed restrictions on bank subsidiaries, in that they could "engage only in
activities national banks may engage in directly, 'subject to the same terms
and conditions that govern the conduct of such activities by national
banks."'" Whether this language demonstrated congressional intent to
become the exclusive regulators of bank subsidiaries is a question that
ultimately divided the Court.

57
58

Id. at 352.
Christopher RJ. Pace, Supremac ClauseLimitationson FederalRegulatoryPreemption, 11 TEX. REV.

L. & POL. 157, 159 (2006).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
12 U.S.C. S 24a(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
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B. The DistinguishingCharacteristicBetween the State and Federal Banking
Regulatory Systems
The primary regulatory distinction between the state and national
banking systems is located in their respective charters. 64 National banks are
chartered under the NBA, while state banks are chartered pursuant to state
law.6 ' This is not an immaterial distinction. National banks chartering and
66
regulatory body is the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).
But state banks are chartered by regulatory bodies of a particular state.67
National and state banks objected to the growing ossification of
regulatory controls. For example, all banks which are members of the
Federal Reserve System fall within the regulatory power of the Federal
Reserve Board. 6s The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is
another body with regulatory control over state and national banks.69 State
banks are also subject to regulators that govern their respective state banking
systems.7 0
In addition to regulatory bodies that govern depository institutions
directly, numerous organizations exercise regulatory control over depository
institutions in an indirect manner.71 Bank merger-applications, for example,
are evaluated by the Department of Justice under federal antitrust laws.7'
Banks that engage in specific security activities find themselves subject to the
regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 73 Additionally, state
insurance boards potentially have regulatory power to shape bank activity

64

Reardon, supra note 47, at 353.

65

Id.

66
67

Id.
Id.

68

Id.

Id. at 353-54. FDIC membership is advertised by banks to demonstrate to potential customers
the safety of their deposit in the event of a bank failure. Id. at 354.
70
Id. The Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") adds to the complexity of the banking regulatory
structure. Federal savings and loan associations ("S&L's") fall within the ambit of the OTS's regulatory
control. Id. Although S&L's are not banks, the distinctions are diminutive to those foreign to banking
law. Id. In addition to S&L's, another non-banking institution akin to a bank is a credit union. Id. Credit
unions are governed by the regulatory body known as the National Credit Union Administration
("NCUA"). Id. Regulations governing federal and state credit unions, are administered via the NCUA,
and pertain to banks whose shares are federally insured. Id. State regulatory bodies of the various states
also govern state non-bank depository institutions. Id.
71

Id. at 355.

7

Id.

73

Id.
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within the ambit of the insurance industry.74 Banks, in their capacity as a
corporation, may find themselves subject to state oversight by the state of
incorporation. s Amid the morass of regulatory bodies, both state and
federal, Barnett Bank of Marion County, NA. v. Nelson,76 established a
preemption standard to limit a state's ability to exercise control over national
banks within its jurisdiction. 7"
C. Barnett and its Progeny
The Supreme Court clarified the standard for preemption of state
banking law in Barnett.78 The Barnett Court, in an opinion authored by
Justice Breyer, decided whether a federal statute permitting national banks
to sell insurance in small towns preempts a state statute that forbids such
action. 79 The Court held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 80 which
permitted banks in small towns to sell insurance, preempted a Florida statute
that barred most banks from selling insurance."'
The Court recapitulated the rule it had developed for when a federal
banking statute preempted state law.Y The Court observed, "[our] cases take
the view that normally Congress would not want States to forbid, or to
impair significantly, the exercise of a power that Congress explicitly granted
[to national banks]."" Barnett can be characterized as an expression of the
Court's reluctance to interpret federal banking regulation as a "floor" rather
than a "ceiling." At the same time, the scope of the holding was misinterpreted by the majority in Watters. Unlike the way it is used in that decision,
Barnett seems to stand only for the proposition that an explicit grant from
Congress of national bank power should not be significantly obstructed. The
use of the word "explicit" suggests that a congressional grant of a particular
74
75
76

Id.
Id.
517 U.S. 25 (1996).

n

See id.
See generally Howard N. Cayne & Nancy L. Perkins, Point-Counterpoint: Federal Preemption:
National Bank Act Preemption: The OCC's New Rules Do Not Pose A Threat to Consumer Protectionor the Dual
Banking System, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 365,368-91 (2004).
79
Barnett, 517 U.S. at 27.
so
15 U.S.C. 1012 (2006).
s
Barnett, 517 U.S. at 42.
2
Id.
W' Id. at 33. Three years later, Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Section 104(d) (2)
of the Act codified and clarified the Barnett standard for preemption of state laws regulating banks' sale of
insurance as to any state law passed before September 3, 1998 (the date on which the provisions of section
104(d)(2) were first introduced in Congress). Barnett,however, was partially overridden by Section 104(e)
of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
78

S
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national bank power should be fairly clear before the court moves to an
analysis of whether state regulation significantly impairs the exercise of that
power. Furthermore, it is unclear whether Bamett's rule applies when an
administrative agency has taken an expansive view of the scope of national
bank powers. This set the stage for the battle in Watters.
IV.WATTERS:

A. Michigan'sRegulation of a Wholly-Owned Subsidiary:A Mountain or a
Molehill?
To understand the Watters case, it is important to distinguish between
two entities that sound similar but are in legal terms, quite distinct: Wachovia
Bank and Wachovia Mortgage. Wachovia Bank, a national banking
association, is chartered by the OCC. Wachovia Mortgage was a North
Carolina corporation that conducted real estate lending in Michigan and
throughout the nation. Although Michigan's statutory regime exempts
national banks from state mortgage lending regulation, it compels mortgage
brokers, lenders, and servicers that are subsidiaries of national banks to
register with the State's Office of Insurance and Financial Services (OIFS)
and submit to state supervision.8s
From 1997 until 2003, Wachovia Mortgage was registered with OIFS to
conduct mortgage lending."' During that time, Wachovia Mortgage, as a
registrant, was required to pay an annual operating fee, file an annual report,
and could have been required to open its books and records to scrutiny by
OIFS employees.8 7 Wachovia Mortgage does not appear to have alleged that
such regulations were particularly burdensome during this time.
In January 2003, Wachovia Mortgage became a wholly-owned operating
subsidiary ofWachovia Bank. 8 The reasons for this shift in corporate form
are murky and ambiguous. Counsel for Wachovia suggested, in oral
argument before the Supreme Court, that such a shift was based on
managerial efficiency.89 Several Justices were skeptical. 9°

Watters v. Wachovia Bank, NA, 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1565 (2007).
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Id.
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Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, NA, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2006)
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The most obvious benefit for the adoption of an independent corporation was to shield both Wachovia Mortgage and Wachovia Bank from liability
should there be a major lawsuit or financial crisis. While it would be unusual
for a wholly-owned bank subsidiary to become insolvent, such a possibility
is heightened by the increased risk associated with greater speculation in the
lending market. Another possible explanation was to free the subsidiary from
state regulation, thus giving the entity a potential advantage over state
competitors. At the same time, Wachovia contended that state competitors
are not subject to national bank regulation, so such a move would merely
level the playing field unless there was a significant difference between
national and state regulation.9 1 Still, several Justices raised the idea that
Wachovia was attempting to "have its cake and eat it too" by accepting the
liability benefits of a state corporate form, but claiming freedom from state
regulatory requirements. 9
Whatever the reasons for assuming the new corporate form, Wachovia
Mortgage notified the State ofMichigan that it was surrendering its mortgage
lending registration. 93 Wachovia Mortgage asserted that, because it had
become an operating subsidiary of a national bank, Michigan's registration
and inspection requirements were preempted. 94 Wachovia contended that a
wholly-owned subsidiary was essentially a part of a national bank, and the
corporate form should not interfere with the traditional freedom from state
regulation enjoyed by national banks. 9' The OCC agreed, finding that
wholly-owned subsidiaries of national banks were to be treated as free from
state regulations unless specifically exempted by the NBA.96
Linda Watters, the commissioner of OIFS, administered Michigan's
lending laws. As commissioner, she exercised "general supervision and
control" over registered lenders. 97 Moreover, Watters possessed the authority
to carry out examinations and investigations as well as enforce requirements
91
92

93

See Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1565-66.
Transcript, supra note 89, at 26-27.
Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1565.

Id.
See id. at 1565-66.
See id.
at 1566.
9
MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. S 445.1661(1) (West 2008). In particular, Wachovia Mortgage and
Wachovia Bank challenged certain provisions of two Michigan statutes as preempted, the Mortgage
Brokers, Lenders, and Services Licensing Act and the Secondary Mortgage Loan Act. The segments of
the challenged provisions (1) require mortgage lenders to register and pay fees to the State before they
may conduct banking activities in Michigan, and authorize the commissioner to deny or revoke
registrations; (2) require submission of annual financial statements to the commissioner and retention of
certain documents in a particular format; (3) grant the commissioner inspection and enforcement
authority over registrants; and (4) authorize the commissioner to take regulatory or enforcement actions
against covered lenders. Id.
95
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The investigation of consumer complaints and
against registrants. 98
enforcement action also falls within the ambit of her authority. This power
is significantly restricted, however, because it is only triggered if Watters
finds that a complaint is not "being adequately pursued by the appropriate
federal regulatory authority. "99 In response to Wachovia's assertion of
freedom from state regulation, Watters issued a letter advising Wachovia
Mortgage that it would no longer be authorized to conduct mortgage-lending
activities in Michigan. 1°°
After receipt ofWatters' letter, Wachovia Mortgage and Wachovia Bank
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Michigan against Watters seeking declaratory and injunctive relief °1 Such
relief would prohibit Watters from enforcing Michigan's registration
prescriptions against Wachovia Mortgage, and from interfering with OCC's
exclusive visitorial authority. Wachovia argued that the NBA and its related
regulations, vest supervisory authority in the OCC to preempt the
application of the Michigan's law to its wholly-owned state subsidiaries) °2
B. A Chevron Approach to Watters
Both the district court and the circuit court utilized the Chevron test to
interpret the validity of OCC regulation 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006.'03 As discussed
above, this regulation by the OCC barred state control over wholly-owned
subsidiaries of national banks even if they used a state corporate form.
Since the Chevron test generally favors federal agencies, Watters made a
creative, yet unsuccessful argument, which would avoid Chevron entirely. In
what some legal scholars term "Chevron step-zero," the court must examine
whether a particular agency has the authority to issue a regulation at all for
certain subject matter based on the underlying organic act.' 4 Watters argued
that no agency has the power to preempt state law through a regulation
unless Congress explicitly authorizes such authority. 5 Both the district and
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Id. at S445.1665.
Id. atS 445.1663(2).
Watter, 127 S. Ct. at 1565.
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See Wachovia Bank, NA v. Watters, 334 F. Supp. 2d 957 (W.D. Mich. 2004); see Wachovia
Bank, NA v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2005).
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United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); seealsoJacobE. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule,
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Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116YALE L.J. 676,714-15 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA.
L. REV. 187 (2006).
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Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1571.
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circuit court rejected this argument."06
They correctly held that a
congressional grant of authority to interpret a federal statute includes, at least
some authority to overrule conflicting state law. 7
Both courts applied Chevron step-one, whether Congress has spoken
directly to the issue, to interpret 484(a) of the NBA.'0 8 The district court did
not address step-one directly because Watters and Wachovia stipulated that
the statutory language was silent concerning wholly owned bank
subsidiaries.0 9 Thus, strangely, Wachovia conceded at the district court level
the argument that would ultimately prevail at the U.S. Supreme Court,
whose majority held otherwise." 0 The circuit court, however, addressed
Chevron step-one in more detail.
The circuit court began its analysis of Chevron step-one with the highly
dubious proposition that OCC regulations "do not expand the definition of
'national bank' as Congress used it in [NBA] section 484 to include an
'operating subsidiary,' such as Wachovia Mortgage.""' Rather, the court
concluded that the regulations interpret an entirely different statutory
provision, that of a national bank's "incidental powers" under GrammLeach-Bliley. This statute authorized national banks to conduct business
through an operating subsidiary." 2
With this move, the circuit court completely sidesteps the issue at
hand." 3 The federal statute referred to, Gramm-Leach-Bliley, and
subsequent regulations merely confirmed the power of national banks to
own an "operating subsidiary."" 4 The OCC also staked its claim to interpret
various incidental powers beyond those specifically enumerated in the
statute. " 5 That a national bank has the power to own a subsidiary, however,
does not mean that such a subsidiary now falls within the meaning of the
phrase "national bank" for purposes of the NBA.
It is true that a regulation interpreting Gramm-Leach-Bliley provides
that "an operating subsidiary conducts activities authorized under this section
pursuant to the same authorization, terms, and conditions that apply to the
conduct of such activities by its parent national bank."" 6 But this regulation
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See Wachovia Bank, 334 F. Supp. 2d 957; see Wachovia Bank, 431 F.3d 556.
Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1573.
Wachovia Bank, 334 F. Supp. 2d. at 963; Wachovia Bank, 431 F.3d at 560-561.
Wachovia Bank, 334 F. Supp. 2d. at 963.
See id. at 961-62.
Wachovia Bank, 431 F.3d at 561.
12 U.S.C. S24(Seventh) (2000).
Wachovia Bank, 431 F.3d at 561.
See id.
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12 C.F.R. S 5.34(e)(3) (2006).
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does not address the issue of whether Congress has spoken about national
bank subsidiaries in section 484(a).
Having found that Congress was silent about whether the OCC had the
ability to preempt state laws despite section 484(a)'s exclusive reference to
national banks, the circuit court moved to step-two." 7 The application of
Chevron step-two seeks to determine whether the regulations are a reasonable
construction of the statutory scheme."' In rejecting Watters' argument, the
circuit court concluded that the Comptroller's regulations were a reasonable
construction of the NBA." 9 The circuit court reasoned that the regulations
simply recognize the reality that national banks have been conducting
business vis-a-vis operating subsidiaries for decades. The circuit court went
further in its pursuit to meet Chevron step-two's reasonableness criteria by
rationalizing that the regulation "simply reflect[s] the eminently reasonable
conclusion that when a bank chooses to utilize the authority it is granted
under 12federal law, it ought not be hindered by conflicting state regula"
tions. 0
The court deferred to the OCC's determination that an operating
subsidiary is subject to state regulation only to the extent that the parent bank
would be if it performed the same functions.' 2 ' Furthermore, the court
rejected Watters' Tenth Amendment argument. The Sixth Circuit affirmed
on similar grounds.' 2 Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 23
C. The PracticalImplications of Watters: To Catch a FinancialPredator24
While there are interesting constitutional complexities to Watters, it is
significant to note why Michigan was willing to fight so vigorously for the
right to exercise its regulatory power, and why Wachovia fought so hard
against it.
The need for state oversight of mortgage lending practices is exemplified
by the experience of Prospero Torralba. A thirty-six year old construction
worker, he purchased a modest home in May 2006.25 Shortly thereafter, he
received notice from a lender that he owed $679 per month, in addition to
his regular mortgage payment, in exchange for a $74,000 "down payment
117
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assistance" loan.' 26 The problem was that Mr. Torralba was not aware that
he had incurred such a loan, since it had not been disclosed to him in his
127
native language of Spanish, and was omitted from several key documents.
Federal law requires that real estate mortgage documents be drafted and
signed in English. 2 California state law, however, requires that the
documents be translated into Spanish if the primary negotiations were
conducted in Spanish, as was the case with Mr. Torralba1 29 Mr. Torralba is0
13
now suing the creditor, who was not involved in the initial negotiations.
Consequently, the creditor is suing the originator of the loan. The originator
claims that she is immune from suit due to the statute of limitations. The
end result? Although the suit is still ongoing, Mr. Torralba notes, "with so
much sacrifice, we tried to get ahead, all for the
possibility of this man to
13 1
come and take the house.. . it was no[t] fair."
Mr. Torralba's story demonstrates why state law is often better equipped
to address predatory lending practices. Federal legislation mandating
translation of documents might seem inefficient or unnecessary in some
states, but if California recognized a problem of predatory lending practices
targeting non-English speakers, their state law seems to be an appropriate
response. The Michigan statute at issue in Watters was a similar attempt by
a state government to fill in a gap left by the federal regulatory scheme
because Michigan officials apparently viewed the system as open to abuse by
unscrupulous mortgage lenders. Michigan's objective, as well as similar
ones in twenty-nine other states, was to discourage predatory lending
practices, particularly where it seemed that federal regulations offer weak or
inefficient assurances of consumer protection.
Consumer protection is quintessentially a "field which the states have
traditionally occupied." 32 This law was seen as an important role in the fight
against predatory lending, bearing in mind that it may be difficult for the
federal government to give appropriate attention to individual consumer
133
complaints.
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Predatory lending is distinct from subprime lending. Subprime lending
typically involves a loan where the credit risk of the consumer is greater than
that needed to qualify for the prime rate, and thus interest rates are higher to
accommodate the lender's additional risk.'m Predatory loans, while always
subprime, are ones in which lenders charge more than needed to cover their
additional risks often through deceptive practices or plain fraud. 135 Victims
of these loans are typically elderly or minority consumers, since the lenders
target those with a low or fixed income but with high equity in their
homes.'36 When a consumer has trouble making payments, they are often
encouraged to refinance with high or exorbitant points and fees.' 37 Even
refinancing with an honest lender may bring profit to the predatory
lender
138
who can charge the consumer for early termination of the loan.
Predatory lenders can also take advantage of a holder-due course
doctrine. This doctrine prevents the maker of a note from raising personal
defenses, such as fraud or breach of warranty, against a value-giving assignee
of the note who takes in good faith without notice of such defenses.'3 9 This
rule can force the borrower to continue paying a predatory loan to an
assignee to avoid foreclosure, while having sole recourse against an
unscrupulous originator who may no longer be in business or who may be
judgment proof. A number of state regulations have placed limits on the
liability of an assignee to claim holder in due course protection in the
consumer mortgage context."t ' Although the federal government also passed
legislation in 1994 designed to curb this practice and similar ones, the
number of predatory loans has actually risen since that time.141
If the federal government's efforts are lacking, do the benefits of allowing
states to fill in the enforcement gap outweigh the costs of additional
regulations on banks? The banking industry lobbied extensively that such
state enforcement is unduly burdensome, emphasizing that many predatory
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loans come not from banks, but from used car dealers and payroll lenders.
Accordingly, there is a bill pending in Congress that would preempt all state
regulation of predatory lending practices. 42
Michigan's attempt to regulate was more modest. The State
acknowledged that it could not regulate predatory lending practices by
national banks due to the dual banking system and the NBA. 43 But
Michigan drew the line when it came to subsidiaries of banks taking
advantage of state corporate form without subjecting themselves to state
compliance.
Certainly, some might be initially skeptical about whether national banks
were involved in predatory lending practices, either directly or through their
affiliates. OCC officials suggest that states havejust made a mountain out of
a molehill and that such practice by national banks is rare.'"
While far from common, a number of commentators have suggested that
the OCC is incorrect in its assumption. 4 ' Citibank settled a multi-million
dollar lawsuit for steering its customers to subprime loans when they
qualified for more favorable ones.146 With the commoditization of the loan
market, many national banks often serve as "enablers" of predatory practices
by financing or purchasing loans with originators who violate federal law. If
federal regulators were investigating such practices vigorously, it seems
unlikely that the Michigan legislature would have bothered to insert an
enforcement provision triggered whenever a complaint is not 147
"being
adequately pursued by the appropriate federal regulatory authority.
If Watters was a simple preemption case, the Rice presumption against
federal displacement of at least arguably complementary state consumer
protection law would have made a strong case for Michigan. But the Rice
presumption was countered by a competing presumption: deference to a
federal agency's interpretation of a federal law under Chevron. As discussed
above, Chevron deference is anchored in the idea that federal agencies have a
particular expertise in the area of law covered by the statute. 4 '
"Shouldn't it be the Congress of the United States that would preempt
something by statute... rather than a regulatory body.., such as the OCC?"
asked the Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee during hearings on
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the subject. 149 This was also the question faced by the district court in
Watters.
D. FourPossible Interpretationsof Section 484(a)
A single sentence in the NBA became a hall of mirrors in which ajudge's
interpretation revealed a lot about their view of the role of the federal
government in banking regulation. The relevant statutory text is "[n]o
national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by
Federal law .... 50
Interpretation #1: Congress unambiguously indicated its intent to preempt
regulationof both national banks and their wholly owned state subsidiaries.
This essentially is the flawed position taken by a majority of the Supreme
Court opinion.' This loose interpretation did not refer much to the explicit
statutory language. Instead, it "was salted" with other somewhat related
congressional statutes that vaguely hinted that national bank subsidiaries
were to be treated as national banks, as well as the general policy of the NBA
to avoid duplicative regulation.
Interpretation #2: Congress was silent on whether section 484(a) applied to
wholly owned state subsidiariesbut the OCC reasonably interpretedthe statute and its
interpretationis entitled to deference.
The Sixth Circuit and the federal district court adopted this view.5 2 The
courts correctly recognized that "national bank" cannot unambiguously
express the inclusion of subsidiaries. The courts then applied Chevron's
deference to federal administrative interpretation in light of agency expertise,
and refused to alter the presumption based on preemption concerns."'
Interpretation #3: Congress was silent as to whether section 484(a) applied to
subsidiariesbut the OCC's interpretationwas unreasonable,and is therefore not entitled
to deference.
The Watters dissent took this position.'- When choosing between the
Chevron presumption, and the Rice anti-preemption presumption, this view
appropriately emphasizes federalism and efficiency concerns over the blind

149
Recent Case, Federal Preemption - Chevron Ddfernce - Second Circuit Finds National Bank
OperatingSubsidiary Ecmptedfrom State Law. - Wachovia Bank v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2005), 119
HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1598 (2006).
ISO 12 U.S.C. S484(a) (2006).
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deference of Chevron to a federal agency with little incentive to take
federalism into account. '
Interpretation #4: Congress unambiguouslyexpressed its intent to apply 484(a)
to nationalbanks only, and not their wholly owned subsidiaries.
The Watters dissent also expresses some support for this position. Under
this perspective, the plain statutory text of section 484(a) only refers explicitly
to "national banks" and therefore must be amended before
wholly owned
56
subsidiaries could reasonably be brought within its ambit.'
E. The Majority'sOverly Broad View of CongressionalIntentAbout Visitorial
Power
The majority, in an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, strangely
chose to avoid the somewhat firmer ground of the lower court's use of
interpretation #2 (Chevron deference) in favor of a rather strained version of
interpretation #1 (direct interpretation of the underlying statute).' 7 With
only a cursory mention of Chevron, the majority concludes that the
underlying statutory language itself preempts state regulation over any
operating subsidiaries, and that the subsequent OCC regulation merely
"clarifies and confirms" the majority's extremely broad interpretation of the
language. 58 The Court's reasoning, however, is highly questionable and, if
taken literally, has broad implications for the future of any meaningful state
consumer protection law in the mortgage industry.
The Michigan statute, in an attempt to minimize the burden on national
banks, only authorized state oversight if the relevant federal agency
"inadequately" addressed the consumer complaint. Justice Ginsburg took
particular issue with this section in oral argument. Calling it a "reverse
supremacy," she questioned whether states should have the "last word." 5 9
In response, Justices Roberts and Scalia suggested it was not unique for a
state regulatory scheme to complement a federal one, such as a situation
where a federal prosection for manslaughter does not prevent a state from
pursuit of a murder charge; or where a victim of a civil rights violation may
sue in state court regardless of whether the federal government has pursued
a civil penalty.'t6
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In this debate, Justices Roberts and Scalia seem to have the upper hand,
when the facts of the case are seen as a coherent whole. In addition, federal
laws such as the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
regulate the real estate finance market without displacement of comparable
state regulations. 6 ' This is not a case, as Justice Ginsburg implies, where
states are preventing Congress from accomplishing a goal that empowers the
individual in the wake of influential business interests. Instead, the roles are
reversed: Congress, through the NBA, wants to empower national banks
through deregulation. and economic efficiency. At the same time, such
deregulation creates a risk of abuse. In this scenario, the Court should not
be so quick to presume that Congress intended to prevent States from adding
additional layers of protection for less empowered interests.
Michigan, as well as Justice Stevens' dissent, point out that the language
of section 484 of the NBA provides that "[n]o nationalbank shall be subject
to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law."' 62 The majority
opinion, however, reads this to encompass congressional intent that "national
bank" be read as "national bank, as well as any state entity through which the
national bank exercises its powers."
Justice Ginsburg writes that the Court has "interpreted grants of both
enumerated and incidental 'powers' to national banks as grants of authority
not normally limited by, but rather ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state
law."163 It is true that Congress granted national banks the power to enter the
mortgage business. A national bank that issues a mortgage therefore is not
subject to any state regulation that significantly impairs this power. But if
Congress intended such a power to extend to wholly-owned state
subsidiaries, it could easily have amended section 484 to reflect this.
Does that reasonably lead to the interpretation that Congress intended
to avoid a state regulation of subsidiaries? Justice Ginsburg answers in the
affirmative when she writes that "... in analyzing whether state law hampers
the federally permitted activities of a national bank, we have focused on the
" 64
exercise of a national bank's powers, not on its corporate structure.
Barnett, the authority cited for this proposition, does, in fact, mention powers
of a national bank. 6 But the reference is somewhat deceptive because the
statute in Barnett explicitly referred to powers of a national bank.166 In Watters,
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Federal Preemption, supra note 133.
Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1578 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1567 (majority opinion) (citing Barnett Bank of Marion County, NA. v. Nelson, 517

U.S. 25,32 (1996)).
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the statute in question (section 484) makes no mention of the powers of a
national bank. It merely states that national banks are free from certain
restrictions; this is not a power, but rather freedom from the power of
another. 67
Justice Ginsburg takes her biggest leap in logic when she asserts that
Congress unambiguously expressed its intent regarding section 484(a)
through other related statutes and the 1999 amendment. 68 She initially
seems to make the dissent's case when she discusses that the 1864 statute and
1933 revision could not have included wholly-owned subsidiaries within
section 484(a) because such subsidiaries were unlawful under federal law at
the time. 69
Without any citation for support, she then writes that "[o]ver the past
four decades, during which operating subsidiaries have emerged as important
instrumentalities of national banks, Congress and OCC have indicated no
doubt that such subsidiaries are 'subject to the same terms and conditions'
as national banks themselves."' 70 The internal quotation is a reference to the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, a federal statute which allows banks to own
subsidiaries as long as those subsidiaries are subject to the same limitations
as national banks.' 71 Under the majority's reasoning, this was a grant of a
national bank "power" that could not be significantly impaired by any state
visitorial "power."
The majority seems to misinterpret the textual language of section
484(a). The only powers referred to by the statute itself are state visitorial
powers; the statute's provisions only explicitly apply to national banks. As
the dissent points out, the majority's interpretation reduces section 484(a) to
mere surplusage, implying that, once national banks became authorized to
72
own subsidiaries in 1966, all such subsidiaries were free of state regulation.
Essentially, the Court appears to be bending over backwards to favor
national banks in this specific instance but avoids the pressing constitutional
and administrative law questions. As Justice Ginsburg confirms in a
footnote, "[b]ecause we hold that the NBA itself-independent of OCC's
regulation-preempts the application of the pertinent Michigan laws to
national bank operating subsidiaries, we need not consider the dissent's
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lengthy discourse on the
dangers of vesting preemptive authority in
173
administrative agencies."
A phrase that rose repeatedly in oral arguments was "to have [one's cake]
and eat it too."'74 The bench used the phrase to refer to Wachovia's attempt
to take advantage of the benefits of a state corporate form, but avoid the state
regulations and costs that come with it. 7 ' But, the phrase applies equally
well to the majority opinion. Through a strained interpretation of legislative
intent, the majority reached the result it sought (a single set of regulations for
wholly owned bank subsidiaries) but refused to acknowledge, as both the
district court and circuit court had, that this case set a precedent for the
ability of an administrative agency to preempt state law.
V. AN UNLIKELYALLIANCE: WHY STEVENS, SCALIA,
AND ROBERTS GOT IT RIGHT

It is said that the first step in recovery is acknowledgment of the problem.
The most important aspect of Stevens' dissent is its avoidance of denial about
a disturbing trend of undue deference to federal power, particularly
unelected federal officials.'76 While the problem was on a vastly greater scale,
the Supreme Court's excessive deference to a military officer's discretion
enabled a compliant Congress and President to avoid accountability for one
of the United States' most shameful episodes in Korematsu v. United States.'
In Watters, Justice Stevens' dissent at least takes the small step of placing
restrictions on the unelected (and generally unaccountable) branch of
government when it attempts to encroach on the power of a democratically
elected, accountable state legislature.
First, Justice Stevens succinctly explains why the Court's combination
78
of statutes fails to express an unambiguous intent to preempt state law.'
Noting the "vast and obvious difference between rules authorizing or
regulating conduct and rules granting immunity from regulation," he shows
that Congress' grant of authority to the OCC to authorize subsidiaries to
perform various business functions is a "lesser power."17' The greater power,
unauthorized by Congress, is the ability to immunize these actors from state
17

Id. at 1572 n.13.
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to an unelected official, see Patrick O. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L.REV. 1933 (2003).
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Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1582-83 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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law that prohibits certain conduct by those with equal status under state
corporate law.
Chevron deference is unwise in this area. Preemption doctrine requires
application of complex legal rules, in which a court's expertise is significant.
In addition, preemption of state law raises sensitive questions of federalism,
and agencies are ill-equipped to resolve the appropriate balance of power
between federal and state actors. The federal agency, in effect, is forced to
become an arbiter of its own power, a calculus sure to favor expansive
administrative power. Justice Stevens correctly points out that no matter
what the Court states, this is a case about whether administrative agencies
can pass a rule purely to preempt state law."8 °
VI. THE MERITS OF STATE REGULATION:
A RESPONSE TO THE COLE ANALYSIS

As evidenced by the discussion above, defining congressional intent from
statutory language is a highly subjective exercise.18 Should we force a
national bank to choose between asset protection (i.e., "the cake") and
deregulation ("eating it too")? It seems like it should be Congress itself who
should make such a choice. But when Congress, whether through intent or
happenstance, does not make such a choice it forces the Court into the
awkward position of deciding the implications of ducking the question.
Professor G. Marcus Cole'82 offers a compelling interpretation of the Court's
divisions when he suggests that the difference between the majority and the
dissent was ultimately a policy choice disguised as a doctrinal choice. 3
The Court purports to use primarily doctrinal reasoning. Justice
Stevens, for example, vigorously asserts that "competitive equities" and
federalism require deference to state regulatory schemes." s Through the
majority's doctrinal lens, Justice Ginsburg interprets the statutory language
broadly (and far more expansively than the district and circuit court
opinions) to infer deference to federal control over bank subsidiaries.
Such reasoning, however, may well have been motivated by the Justices'
underlying instinctive views on the significance and effectiveness of state
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Id. at 262.
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consumer protection law in the mortgage context. The majority opinion
makes no reference to state consumer protection law, and the dissent only
does so briefly. But as a matter of policy, a decision in favor of Wachovia
allows national banks to lend to higher risk consumers with less oversight,
where the contrary outcome would have restricted lending to high risk
customers for fear of being labeled "predatory."
While the term "consumer protection" suggests a laudable goal, the
merits of state regulatory schemes that purport to do so are a matter of
debate. Professor Cole argues, somewhat persuasively, that state-consumerprotection-law often hurts consumers more than it helps them.8 5
To illustrate, Professor Cole uses as an example a 2004 Illinois law that
required mandatory credit counseling, paid for by the lender, in several "high
The law was intended to protect consumers from
risk" zip codes.'"
predatory lending and reduce foreclosures, but Professor Cole suggests it had
the unintended consequence of "protecting" high risk consumers from
receiving a loan in the first place. By adding a $500 to $700 cost to the loan,
most lenders either raised interest rates or refused to lend in those areas.
took
Home sales dropped by 45% in those zip codes the moth after the bill
s7
foreclosures.'
in
drop
a
to
lead
did
law
the
effect. At the same time,
Professor Cole essentially argues that the Watters majority reached the
right result because he sees NBA preemption as a means of liberating highrisk consumers from oppressive state limits of high-risk credit. In Marquette
National Bank v. First Omaha Serv. Corp.,'8s the Court held that the NBA
preempted most state credit card interest rate ceilings. 8 9 Professor Cole
believes that such ceilings can make it more difficult for high-risk consumers
to receive credit and may drive them to illegal loan sharks or similar
sources.

19
0

But Professor Cole emphasizes all the benefits of free market access to
credit without giving much credence to the costs. In light of the current
mortgage "bubble" bust, it is certainly arguable that somewhat greater
governmental oversight of extension of credit may have averted a rash of
foreclosures, but still struck a balance between economic efficiency and
consumer protection. Furthermore, national banks still have a choice to
enter the mortgage market free of any state regulation, rather than operate
through a wholly-owned subsidiary. If state banks feel the regulations are
1s8
18
187

18
t89
I9

See id. at 264-75.
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Id. at 266.
439 U.S. 299 (1978).
Cole, supra note 183, at 271.
See id.
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unduly burdensome they may lobby the state legislature with empirical
evidence (for example, by comparing their foreclosure rate with those of
national, less regulated, lenders), or even merge with a national bank to gain
a competitive advantage.
The other major flaw in Professor Cole's position is that, while he
discusses the burdens of state oversight in great detail, he never adequately
justifies the need for asset protection through the state corporate form. After
all, Wachovia could have easily avoided the Michigan controversy altogether
by making Wachovia Mortgage a division of its national entity. There is
always the risk of a debilitating lawsuit, but even Wachovia seemed to
downplay this risk. In oral argument, an exchange between Justice Stevens
and the attorney for Wachovia is revealing:
JUSTICE STEVENS: [Branches of national banks] are not separate
corporate subsidiaries.
MR. LONG: That - that JUSTICE STEVENS: Why is that, that the best bank decided to use
the subsidiary approach for this business, rather than the more
traditional banking approach.
MR. LONG: Well, of course, anything that a bank does through an
operating subsidiary it could do through the bank. It can always do
it through the bank. But there are many reasons why a bank may
choose an operating subsidiary. They can be managerial reasons; it's
-just sometimes works better as matter of business management.
JUSTICE STEVENS: It protects from liability, too.
MR. LONG: Well, that is one of the reasons. AlthoughJUSTICE STEVENS: -in the district.
MR. LONG: I will say, Justice Stevens, I have not been able to find
examples of national bank operating subsidiaries that have become
insolvent. They are regulated very heavily by the Comptroller and
so they don't. 9 '
There is nothing wrong with Congress making a policy choice to free
national banks from regulation. If state regulation, however, is considered
burdensome by a national bank, there seems to be little disincentive to
folding them into the national bank itself. If the bank fears unprecedented
tort litigation that might endanger its assets, perhaps it should reexamine its
lending policies to at least somewhat lessen this risk.
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Professor Cole is correct, however, that Watters created "strange
bedfellows" because it divides the conservatives from the libertarians,
revealing the nuances of the Justices'judicial philosophy. Justices Alito and
Kennedy, one imagines, would fall into the "libertarian" camp: Such a
position views Watters as an opportunity to facilitate a lesser degree of
regulation of a private entity, especially if one disagrees with the merits of
state regulation, even as it seems to disfavor federalism.' 92 Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Souter, the remainingjustices in the majority, likely saw the case
from a structural perspective: a chance to defer to the policy choice of
Congress in an area of traditional economic regulation with little or no
implications for civil liberties.
Justices Scalia and Roberts would take the "conservative" position:
Even if state regulation may create burdens on a private actor, they reason,
the Court cannot abandon its commitment to the role of state actors even
when it disagrees with the state's position. Justice Steven takes a different
kind of democratic accountability/structuralist perspective: he saw Watters as
primarily a chance to limit the power of an aggressive position by an
unelected administrative entity.
While each of the Justices' views have some validity (which is what
makes the case so fascinating), Justice Stevens' position addresses the most
pressing need. With the growth of expansive administrative action, the Court
should take care to ensure that the "fourth branch" of government does not
overtake democratically accountable state actors in the constitutional
hierarchy unless Congress has clearly authorized such a position.
VII. CONCLUSION

While the Court mentioned it in passing, the Watters-opinioncould have
been better reasoned if it had focused more precisely on the Barnett standard.
The Barnett test was a reasonably coherent attempt to strike a balance
between state innovation and consumer protection and the bank's desire for
uniformity in the regulatory context. Remember, Barnett held that, when
interpreting the NBA, "normally Congress would not want States to forbid,
or to impair significantly, the exercise of a power that Congress explicitly
granted." 93
There are two reasons why this test could have been used to apply the
Michigan statute to wholly owned subsidiaries. First, a plausible reading of
the NBA is that the power to run a state subsidiary wholly free of state
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regulation is not a power that Congress has "explicitly granted." Since such
a power is nowhere in the text of the NBA, it should not be viewed as
explicit, and thus it would not be subject to deference under Barnett. Second,
even assuming arguendo that such a power could be incorporated through
Gramm-Leach-Bliley or historical context, the statutes in Michigan do not
"significantly impair" a national bank's powers. Since Wachovia Mortgage
lived with state regulations apparently without incident from 1997 to 2003,
one can infer that there was little impairment during that time.
Furthermore, the intrusion by the state is minimal, and the possibility of
opening up one's records in response to a consumer complaint seems to be
relatively nonintrusive. The Michigan statute here was far less burdensome
on lenders that the Illinois act discussed above. The Michigan statute,
triggered by consumer complaints, merely created an additional watchdog for
predatory practices, thus easing the burden on federal regulators. Perhaps a
relatively narrow interpretation of when a federal agency "inadequately"
responds could help ease the potential burden on these wholly owned
subsidiaries.' 94 But better use of the "significant impairment" test could
allow states to participate in the dual regulatory system, as long as they are
careful not to go too far.
In light of the Watters holding, consumers can only place their trust in the
federal government and hope for the best. Michigan Commissioner Watters
expressed such a sentiment shortly after the case when she said, "[a]s a
commissioner of Michigan, I certainly want to see 95them perform ...and
perform at a very high level to protect consumers."'
Even federal legislators are concerned that the Watters holding may result
in the spread of predatory lending practices to national banks and their units.
Consequently, in May, the Chairmen of both the House Financial Services
Committee and the House Energy and Commerce Committee sent a letter
to multiple federal agencies, urging them to strengthen their rules to protect
consumers against unfair and deceptive practices in the financial services
industry. Neil Milner, Conference of State Bank Supervisors President, said
states will need to push U.S. lawmakers to see if"a federal system is going to
...
have that same kind of responsiveness to the individual customers as what
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thousands of people at the state level do for consumers."'1 A bill is currently
before Congress that would effectively overrule Watters but has yet to pass."9
Thus, while Watters was a step forward for deregulation and broad access
to credit, it was two-steps backward for a true dual banking system that gives
state actors the ability to protect their citizens from unfair and deceptive
lending practices.
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